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Towards Monitoring Galileo: The European GNSS Supervisory Au-
thority in statu nascendi = Zur künftigen Überwachungsagentur des 
Galileo Systems, Vers une autorité de surveillance du système Galileo
by Dr. Frans G. von der Dunk, Leiden*
1. Introduction
There is little doubt that one of the most interesting and revolutionary, but also 
complicated and challenging space projects of today is Galileo, Europe’s own 
full-fledged second-generation navigation satellite system. Developed jointly by 
the European Union through the Commission and the European Space Agency, 
Galileo should by the end of the decade have thirty operational satellites in mid-
dle-earth-orbits providing timing, positioning and navigation signals across the 
globe.1
From the very beginning Galileo was envisaged in particular by the Commission 
as a public-private-partnership (PPP). On the one hand, a private concessionaire 
should operate the system as of full operational capability (originally scheduled 
for 2008, but more likely to occur not until a few years thereafter) and provide, 
market and sell its services – the Open Service (OS), the Commercial Service (CS), 
the Safety-of-Life Service (SOL), the Public Regulated Service (PRS) and a contri-
bution to existing Search-and-Rescue services (SAR).2 On the other hand, a public 
body should monitor all such activities and the evident public interests in them – 
keeping them safe, secure and in mankind’s interest in general.
Such a public side to the PPP-equation was given its first embodiment with the cre-
ation of the Galileo Interim Support Structure (GISS) in 2001. The GISS was essen-
tially a number of ESA officials being seconded under Commission funding (and 
control) to supervise and guide the various projects under the EU’s Fifth Frame-
work Programme supporting the definition and development phase of Galileo.
----------------
*Director Space Law Research, International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden Uni-
versity. This Article forms part of the Leiden Faculty of Law research programme “Secur-
ing the rule of law in a world of multilevel jurisdiction: coherence, institutional principles 
and fundamental rights.”
 1 See for a general overview of the Galileo project and its status e.g. the website of the 
Commission’s DG TREN, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/
index_en.htm.
2 See for a summary description of the key features of each of these five services e.g. the 
present author’s Quis vadit cum vobis, Galileo? – Institutional Aspects of Europe’s Own 
Satellite Navigation System, in Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Colloquium on the Law of Out-
er Space (2004), 361-2.
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The major task of the GISS ended up to be dealing with the intricacies of what had 
become the GALILEI Study, a cluster of originally separate projects dealing with 
key Galileo issues.
A next level of institutionalisation was achieved with the establishment of the 
Galileo Joint Undertaking (GJU), a unique daughter entity of ESA and the Euro-
pean Commission as the two principal international entities behind Galileo.3 The 
GJU kick-started the next phase of Galileo by, most fundamentally, initiating and 
supervising the tendering process for the private Galileo operator, which was to 
lead to the signing of a concession contract by the end of 2005 or shortly thereaf-
ter. In addition, the GJU should prepare the introduction of Galileo more generally 
speaking, which included responsibility for the guidance of a number of Galileo-
related research projects under the EU’s Sixth Framework Programme.4
Currently, the third stage of institutionalisation has been given effect by means 
of the creation – at least on paper – of the European GNSS Supervisory Authori-
ty (EGSA) in 2004.5 With the proper start of operations of EGSA, expected by mid-
2006 or shortly thereafter, the GJU will be dissolved. Contrary to EGSA, the GJU 
was from the beginning envisaged to be a temporary entity.6
The current article tries to provide a first, rather preliminary and provisional eval-
uation of what EGSA will be able to do, by way of supervision of the private oper-
ation of the Galileo system – and hence also what it will likely not be able to do.
2. The Recommendations Coming from the GALILEI Study Cluster
Following up on the general intention of the European Commission to establish 
a public supervisor of the Galileo system, the GALILEI Study cluster studied the 
various issues involved in some detail. Where precisely would such a public su-
pervisor – dubbed ‘Galileo Supervisory Authority (GSA)’ at the time – have to 
play its role, what should be its competencies, and how should its legal/institu-
tional relationship to the private operator be structured?
The Legal/Institutional Task within the Study cluster in its final deliverable came 
up with a number of quite specific recommendations in this respect,7 addressed to 
the Commission as the main political power behind Galileo and under the EC Treaty
----------------
3 See Council Regulation setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking (hereafter GJU Regula-
tion), No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May 2002; OJ L 138/1 (2002).
4 Cf. e.g. Art. 2(3), (4), GJU Regulation.
5 See Council Regulation on the establishment of structures for the management of the Euro-
pean satellite radio-navigation programmes, (hereafter EGSA Regulation) No. 1321/2004/
EC, of 12 July 2004; OJ L 246/1 (2004).
6 See also Art. 20, GJU Regulation.
7 Recommendations and Conclusions arising from Task I, Legal and Institutional Issues, 
of the GALILEI Study Cluster (hereafter Recommendations and Conclusions), DD-120, v. 
2.1, of 24 July 2003.
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under the EC Treaty endowed moreover with extensive relevant, and to some ex-
tent autonomous legislative competencies. According to the Recommendations, 
the role of the envisaged GSA “would have to focus on:
1. providing the political clout at the international level necessary to enhance, 
wherever necessary through international legal agreements, the business oppor-
tunities for the GOC [the future concessionaire], especially with regard to OS [the 
Open Service] and CS [the Commercial Service];
2. ensuring the specific European public interests in GALILEO are duly respected 
by the GOC’s operations and activities, especially when it comes to SOL [the Safe-
ty-of-Life Service], PRS [the Public Regulated Service] and the contribution to SAR 
[the Search-and-Rescue Service];
3. ensuring a proper and generous liability regime, preferably including a Com-
pensation Fund and monitoring such a Fund itself, alternatively directly ensuring 
compensation, for relevant types of damage occurring in the course of GALILEO 
activities and operations;
4. ensuring a proper certification scheme as a specific mean to enhance the overall 
trust of service providers, users, consumers and the public at large in GALILEO; and
5. ensuring any bankruptcy or other market failure of the GOC would not undu-
ly prejudice the overall interests of the GALILEO core states in GALILEO, prefer-
ably through ownership of the system.”8
Further, the GSA “should:
6. be granted clear and substantial international legal personality, in order to act 
as grantor of the concession (and related legal instruments), which in turn requires 
a sound legal basis, in the long run preferably of a GALILEO Convention, in the 
short, run probably by way of extension of the JU [the Galileo Joint Undertaking], 
of EC law;
7. not come to be subsumed under, viz develop out of the EU institutional struc-
ture for reasons of independence and separation of functions vis-à-vis the GAL-
ILEO Regulator [the Recommendations and Conclusions referred to a need for 
a Galileo Regulator in addition to a Supervisory Authority], but (preferably) be 
based upon a GALILEO Convention;
8. be provided with a set of competencies similar to those of the GNSS Entity un-
der the Eurocontrol Framework Agreement, for monitoring the GOC to conse-
quently ensure the implementation of the recommended GALILEO liability con-
tractual agreement copying and adapting the Eurocontrol Framework Agreement 
for the much wider context of GALILEO service provision;
9. serve as an instrument for states participating in GALILEO to bear liability in 
excess of that borne by the GOC or liabilities under insurance policy exclusions, 
and for dealing with further options such as a dedicated compensation amount 
funded by parties other than the participating states through a Compensation 
Fund; Recommendations and Conclusions, 234-5.
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10. with a view to possible liability claims for negligence arising on its part, es-
tablish contractual relations [with] non-GALILEO core states in order to deal with 
such liabilities, with appropriate competencies provided for by the GALILEO 
Convention;
11. in view of the likelihood of claims against GALILEO being class actions, re-
quiring substantial amounts to repair the alleged damages, try to include a specif-
ic portion on punitive damages in the United States in any consideration of apply-
ing a possible public compensation mechanism;
12. fulfil the role of guarantor of the service under any service guarantees to be 
offered by the GOC, the relevant details thereof to be laid down in the Concession 
Agreement and to be referred to by the GALILEO Convention; and
13. be provided with certain competencies regarding IPR protection, enforcement 
and third-party claims, either diplomatically/politically or juridically, using its 
public international status for the benefit of the GOC.”9
It is these thirteen recommendations which can serve as a crude yardstick for the 
present paper to evaluate the actual version of the GSA which has been created: 
the European GNSS Supervisory Authority, EGSA for short.
3. The European GNSS Supervisory Authority: an Overview
On 12 July 2004, a Council Regulation on the establishment of structures for the 
management of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes effectively 
established the EGSA.10
EGSA should take care of the evident public interests in Europe involved in build-
ing and maintaining the Galileo system in the first place (e.g. security11, safety 
and general economic progress), as well as of the international aspects, general-
ly speaking by exercising some form of control over the concessionaire.12 Indeed, 
EGSA will conclude the final concession contract and thus license the concession-
aire.13 In this respect, it may be deemed to comply rather well, generally speaking, 
with Recommendation # 2, calling for the relevant public interests to be sufficient-
ly taken into consideration by the private operator’s activities and his conduct of
----------------
9 Recommendations and Conclusions, 235. The numbering of the Recommendations has 
been changed as compared with the original so as to allow for easier reference throughout 
the current paper.
10 See in particular Art. 1, EGSA Regulation.
11 Art. 7, GJU Regulation, provides for the establishment of a Galileo System Security Board 
composed of one representative from each EU member state plus a representative from the 
Commission, which has authority over GJU activities “for all questions relating to the se-
curity of the system”; see Art. 18, Statutes of the Galileo Joint Undertaking, Annex to the 
GJU Regulation (hereafter GJU Statutes).
12 See in general e.g. EGSA Regulation, Art. 1, 2(1)(j), also recital 5; Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Progress report on the 
GALILEO research programme as at the beginning of 2004, COM(2004) 112 final, of 18 
February 2004, 18.
13 See Art. 2(1)(a), EGSA Regulation.
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business. Still, any in-depth analysis on this point would have to wait until the con-
cession has been finalised and the relevant details thereof would be made avail-
able for scrutiny from this perspective.
In addition, when taking over from the GJU EGSA will become the owner of the 
Galileo satellite system itself.14 This will ensure that any eventual commercial fail-
ure of the concessionaire would not jeopardise at least the provision of those Gali-
leo services that are indispensable from a safety and security perspective; the sys-
tem itself would never become subjected to any legal consequences normally fol-
lowing from such a failure like an attachment to satisfy creditors. This clause takes 
care in a rather comprehensive manner of Recommendation # 5, focusing precise-
ly on such bankruptcy and market failure risks. In addition, this seems to heed 
Recommendation # 2 as well, as a commercial failure would represent one of the 
most important risks inherent in the private operation of Galileo from the public 
perspective.
A further central element of the public monitoring role of EGSA vis-à-vis the con-
cessionaire concerns the issue of certification for safety and security purposes. 
Recommendation # 4 in this respect called for “a proper certification scheme as a 
specific mean to enhance the overall trust of service providers, users, consumers 
and the public at large” in the Galileo system, the institutional structure running 
it and the services to be provided by it. Here, the EGSA Regulation does provide 
for a relevant task of EGSA, namely to “ensure that the components of the system 
are duly certified; it shall empower the appropriate authorised certification bodies 
for issuing the relevant certificates and monitoring the respect of related standards 
and technical specifications.”15 Furthermore, with a view specifically to security is-
sues, EGSA shall also define security specifications and cryptography conditions, 
and act as “the European GNSS security accreditation authority.”16 Finally, the 
justification of EGSA as a public oversight body would be found in the possibili-
ty to offer unlimited or at least very generous liability acceptance in the last resort 
to value-added service providers and end-users (depending upon the outcome in-
ter alia of the concession negotiations), and to enhance trust by the public at large 
in the system (with respect to such issues as certification and safety licenses). The 
liability issue is further dealt with infra;17 at this point it should be noted that also 
for the extent in which Recommendation # 3 is taken into account, further analysis 
would have to wait for the details of the concession. The foundations for a “prop-
er and generous liability regime” are to be laid down in the concession reflect-
ing the respective acceptance by the public and private sides to the PPP of their 
due share of such a liability, which could then to the extent necessary be reflect-
ed in contracts and/or EU legislative measures. The concession at least offers the
----------------
14 See Art. 3(1), EGSA Regulation.
15 Art. 2(1), sub (h), EGSA Regulation.
16 Art. 2(1), sub (j), (ii), (iii), and (v), EGSA Regulation.
17 See para. 6.
Towards MoniToring galileo         
105
instrument to achieve that, as part of the interests on the public side in such a regime.
4. The Legal Basis for the European GNSS Supervisory Authority
The next point for analysis is the legal basis for EGSA, that is the EGSA Regula-
tion. Its enunciation directly touches upon Recommendation # 7, which expressed 
a preference for a Galileo Convention as an independent international legal instru-
ment over a Regulation which, ipso facto, would make EGSA part of the institu-
tional structure of the European Union.18
This would not necessarily preclude a certain measure of independence from the 
main EU organs, as will be seen infra when the next issue, of EGSA’s legal per-
sonality, will be touched upon – although it might make a role for EGSA as an in-
dependent guarantor of Galileo services, following Recommendation # 12, much 
more difficult to realise. Also, the original idea of establishing a distinct Galileo 
Regulator as included in Recommendation # 7 has been transformed, in that most 
of its intended regulatory functions are actually to be taken care of by EGSA.19 
Since EGSA will not itself become involved in the operations of the Galileo sys-
tem directly, let alone the marketing and sales of its services and all it entails, to 
that extent the incorporation of EGSA into the general EU structure may not be 
that problematic anymore. Finally, even the GALILEI Study acknowledged that a 
full-fledged convention would take much time, so that an EU Regulation would at 
least present a viable interim solution.
Nevertheless, the absence of an underlying convention in the end may lead to se-
rious complications. A convention from a theoretical vantage point would at the 
outset create a much more coherent and transparent legal structure, with the add-
ed bonus of being more flexible and straightforward in cases where third states 
may wish to become involved at this level. This is an issue in the case of Galileo, 
in view of Galileo’s fundamental objective to provide services world-wide and the 
large measure of interest on the part of third states consequently to become in-
volved.
In the case of the GJU, this has already led to the accession of the People’s Repub-
lic of China and Israel.20 The relevant agreements on membership of sion and ESA 
jointly as the two ‘parent organisations’ and controlling shareholders of the GJU, 
----------------
18 See also e.g. Art. 1, EGSA Regulation, speaking of a “Community agency”; Art. 4(1), re-
ferring to EGSA as “a body of the Community”; Art. 13, applying relevant EU financial 
rules to EGSA; and Art. 15, making the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the Euro-
pean Communities applicable.
19 Cf. e.g. Art. 2(1), sub (a), (c), (h) and (j), EGSA Regulation.
20 See, resp., Cooperation Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
– Galileo between the European Community and its Member States and the People’s Re-
public of China (hereafter EC-PRC Cooperation Agreement), of 30 October 2003; Doc. 
Council of the European Union, 13324/03; Cooperation Agreement on a Civil Global Nav-
igation Satellite System (GNSS) between the European Community and its Member States
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the GJU however were concluded neither by the GJU itself, nor by the Commisbut 
by the Commission alone.21 The EGSA Regulation offers the same possibility of ac-
cession by third states,22 but such a construction in the case of the GJU has imme-
diately brought some major problems to the fore – noticeably in two areas.
The accession of any third state most fundamentally would engender substantial 
discussion at the highest political levels, between the EU and ESA member states 
as well as vis-à-vis the United States, in view of the geo-political and military/stra-
tegic dimensions of Galileo. For the European authorities in addition the question 
of intellectual property rights is crucial: if private partners are to come on board, 
in particular patent rights would be a key feature of the commercial potential such 
private partners are looking for.
As regards security concerns, in the case of Chinese membership of the GJU a 
middle course was steered by denying the PRC access to the Public Regulated Ser-
vice (PRS), the encrypted governmental service the use of which was at the heart 
of the relevant concerns voiced.23 The Galileo Security Board moreover will keep 
a close watch over the GJU’s activities to ensure that such concerns are taken care 
of in practice: any exports by China to third countries of “sensitive items related 
to the GALILEO programme” can only take place after prior authorisation by the 
Board.24 Likely, such a construction will also result vis-à-vis EGSA.
As to intellectual property rights, the solution achieved by the EC-PRC Coop-
eration Agreement was to apply “appropriate protection of intellectual property 
rights,” and to do so “in accordance with the relevant international standards.”25 
Finally, it has to be noted that the activities of the GJU remained firmly under con-
trol of the Commission (on behalf of the European Union) and ESA. Both were 
statutorily guaranteed to have at least 40% of the total votes in the Administrative
----------------
and the State of Israel, of 2 June 2005, Doc. Council of the European Union, 9482/04. At the 
time of writing, similar agreements are being agreed upon or prepared with such states as 
South Korea, Ukraine, India, and a number of others.
21 According to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council – State of Progress of the Galileo programme, COM(2002) 518 final, of 24 Sep-
tember 2002; OJ 248/2 (2002), 16-7, the founding members of the GJU are to assess the way 
to handle third states’ interests in membership of the GJU, but the Communication itself 
then proceeds with referring to a proposal by the Commission for a mandate by the EU 
Council without further qualifications as to, for example, ESA involvement.
22 See Art. 21(1), referring to the prior condition of having “entered into agreements with 
the European Community to this effect.”
23 Cf. Art. 4(2), EC-PRC Cooperation Agreement, which calls for a separate agreement in 
case the cooperation should extend to “GALILEO Public Regulated Service, system securi-
ty features (…) and critical control features of the GALILEO global segment as well as ex-
change of classified information.”
24 Art. 8(4), EC-PRC Cooperation Agreement.
25 Artt. 3(e), 8(3), EC-PRC Cooperation Agreement.
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Board of the GJU each, the highest body within the organisation.26
While it is thus clear that the fundamental – and justified – security and IPR-re-
lated interests of Europe would require it to maintain ultimate control over the 
Galileo system in some fashion and in a number of key respects, it is submitted 
that a convention would allow for a more coherent and solid legal basis. Estab-
lishment of a constitutive convention of itself of course would not preclude a so-
lution whereby the member states of the European Union (and ESA) would main-
tain such ultimate control as is desired – it is just not dependent upon individu-
al ‘bilateral’ arrangements raising issues of transparency, complexity and perhaps 
discrimination, and certainly of uncertainties which might not bode well for the 
commercial interests involved in the Galileo PPP. In the end this also touches upon 
the main thrust of Recommendation # 1, calling for establishment of a solid legal 
basis for EGSA as possible to generate maximum political clout. Such clout will 
obviously be missing at least for the time being, or more precisely, will (have to) 
be substituted by the more general political clout of the European Union and the 
Commission. 5. The Legal Personality of the European GNSS Supervisory Author-
ity The next major issue concerning EGSA is represented by the extent of the (in-
ternational) legal personality given to it. The EGSA Regulation establishes EGSA 
as “a Community agency” respectively “a body of the Community,”27 which is 
then further elaborated to the extent that EGSA shall enjoy in each of the EU mem-
ber states “the most extensive legal capacity acceded to legal persons under their 
law.”28 This, however, clearly refers to legal personality at a national level, almost 
as a private legal entity (with the primary exception that EGSA is granted some 
rights as an international body under the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities 
of the European Communities29), as it is further specified by Article 4(2) that such 
personality should allow them inter alia to “acquire or dispose of movable and im-
movable property and be a party to legal proceedings.”
With a view to Recommendation # 10, pointing at the desirability of concluding 
agreements on liability claims in the course of contractual relations, such a private 
legal personality may well suffice in principle.30 It certainly would allow the pri-
vate operator to explicitly accept certain liabilities, whether related to third-party 
claims or to service guarantees under the contracts themselves, although the ex-
tent in which the private operator may be interested or willing to do that naturally 
depends upon the terms of the concession – to what extent will the concession force 
the private operator to accept certain liabilities, respectively to what extent does it 
provide him with the means and incentives (e.g. by rights of derogation to EGSA or 
member states of the European Union and/or ESA) to accept them?
----------------
26 See Art. 8(1), GJU Statutes; also (2), (3).
27 Art. 1, resp. Art. 4(1), EGSA Regulation.
28 Art. 4(2), EGSA Regulation.
29 See Art. 15, EGSA Regulation.
30 See further, as to liability, infra para. 6.
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If one looks at the measure of international legal personality, however, things are 
quite different. Of course any ‘external’ international legal personality to a large 
extent depends upon the acceptance thereof by third states, not being members 
of the European Union and hence – perhaps – preferring to deal with the individ-
ual sovereign states behind any entity like EGSA rather than with that entity as 
such. But any future recognition and acceptance of international legal personali-
ty would be made considerably easier if ‘internally’ the necessary competencies 
would be provided for. The ultimate acceptance of the European Union’s inde-
pendent measure of international legal personality by third states in the context of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO)31 and EUROCONTROL32, intergovernmen-
tal organisations to which the Union has now acceded almost on a par with sov-
ereign states, was to a large extent the consequence of the internal transfer of rele-
vant competencies in the areas of international trade and air transport respectively 
from the individual member states to the EU-level under applicable EC law.33
In this respect, the competencies allocated to EGSA under the Regulation for the 
time being might be considered rather limited. EGSA is not so much a new, in-
dependent intergovernmental entity as a Community agency.34 Though such an 
agency might well be delegated with the authority within the EC law framework 
for dealing with third parties, as stemming from the Commission’s general au-
thority to do so on behalf of the Union,35 so far, it has not been given such a man-
date. There is no competence provided in the EGSA Regulation for EGSA to deal 
directly with third states at the level of public international agreements; it remains 
for the Commission to do that.
Also the exercise of any political clout of EGSA, following Recommendation # 1, 
to negotiate and solidify market access arrangements for Galileo’s services – a ma-
jor factor in Galileo’s envisaged commercial success! – is conspicuously absent; at 
each and every turn the Commission should be made to undertake the necessary
----------------
31 Established by the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Marrakesh, 
done 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995; 1867 UNTS; UKTS 1996 No. 57; ATS 
1995 No. 8; 33 ILM 1125, 1144 (1994).
32 Originally established by the Convention Relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, Brussels, done 13 December 1960, entered into force 1 March 1963; 523 UNTS 
117; Cmnd. 2114.
33 See e.g. Art. 80(2), 131-135, Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European 
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts 
(hereafter Treaty of Amsterdam), Amsterdam, done 2 October 1997, entered into force 1 
May 1999; OJ C 340/73 (1997), and respective implementing Directives, Regulations and 
Decisions.
34 See again Art. 4(2), EGSA Regulation.
35 Cf. Art. 300, 301, Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the Commission requires specific 
mandates for negotiating international agreements on GNSS and Galileo issues; see fur-
ther Council of the European Union, 2589th Council Meeting, Transport, Telecommunica-
tions and Energy, Luxembourg, 10-11 June 2004, 9865/04 (Presse 176), 19.
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steps and execute the necessary policies. Along the same lines, participation of 
third states in EGSA requires agreements with the European Community, subject 
to approval by the Council.36
Similarly, with respect to security issues the role of EGSA is clearly a subordinate 
one: wherever “the operation of the system affects the security of the Union or of 
its Member States, the responsibilities and competence of the European Union (…) 
are set out in Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP.”37 It may be noted here that EGSA at 
least will be entitled to “enforce and verify compliance by the concession hold-
er with international rules and agreements”, explicitly referring to the Wassenaar 
Arrangement which is a lynchpin in international efforts to control the risks inher-
ent in dual-use technology.38 Also, EGSA will control the security aspects of in-
dustrial contracts concluded by the concessionaire, define relevant security spec-
ifications and standards, as well as the cryptography requiring governmental ap-
proval.39 EGSA finally will “initiate and monitor the implementation of security 
procedures and perform system security audits”, all however under the sway of 
the Commission and the EU member states through the Centre for Security and 
Safety.40 Whilst EGSA should perhaps be given the mandate to defend Galileo’s 
interests directly, in the context of both the Wassenaar Arrangement and Regula-
tion No. 1334/2000 (which largely translates the non-binding arrangements under 
the Wassenaar Arrangement into binding obligations for the EU member states)41; 
neither do these regimes allow for any such role yet, nor does the EGSA Regula-
tion provide any substantive mandate in this respect.
A last key point in any analysis of the extent of EGSA’s international legal person-
ality refers to its potential roles in the context of (other) intergovernmental organ-
----------------
36 See Art. 21(1), (3), EGSA Regulation.
37 Art. 22, EGSA Regulation.
38 Art. 2(1)(j) sub (vii), EGSA Regulation. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls 
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Wassenaar, done 19 De-
cember 1995, effective 12 July 1996, superseded the old common export control policy re-
gime, and was established in order to contribute to regional and international security and 
stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of convention-
al arms, dual-use goods and dual-use technologies. Of the current twenty-five EU mem-
bers, only Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta are not ‘parties’ to the Wassenaar 
Arrangement. It may be noted furthermore, with a view to Israeli participation in Galileo, 
that Israel is a ‘party’ to the Wassenaar Arrangement.
39 See Art. 2(1)(j) sub (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively, EGSA Regulation.
40 Art. 2(1)(j) sub (v), EGSA Regulation; for the Centre for Security and Safety, see Commu-
nication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Progress re-
port on the GALILEO research programme as at the beginning of 2004, COM(2004) 112 fi-
nal, of 18 February 2004, 18-9. Cf. also Art. 2(1)(j) sub (vi) as far as the Galileo Public Reg-
ulated Service (PRS) is concerned.
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isations, notably with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)42 in view 
of the need of Galileo to be able to use certain frequencies with a minimum of in-
terference. Here as well, the institutional state of affairs is not very articulate yet. 
The EGSA Regulation establishes EGSA as “the concession holder’s sole interloc-
utor on the matter of frequencies”, presumably meaning inter alia that the conces-
sionaire should not itself seek a member state to take up its interests within the 
ITU framework.43
Further to this, those member states already having “lodged files” with the ITU 
for Galileo’s sake “should also allow the Authority [EGSA] to assign the right to
----------------
41 Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-
use items and technology, No. 1334/2000/EC (hereafter Regulation 1334/2000), of 22 June 
2000; OJ L 159/1 (2000). The Regulation has been amended and updated by Council Regu-
lation amending Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to intra-Community transfers 
and exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 2889/2000/EC, of 22 December 2000; 
OJ L 336/14 (2000); Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 with re-
gard to the list of controlled dual-use items and technology when exported, No. 458/2001/ 
EC, of 6 March 2001; OJ L 65/19 (2001); and Council Regulation amending and updating 
Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports 
of dual-use items and technology, No. 2432/2001/EC, of 20 November 2001; OJ L 338/1 
(2001). The last Regulation updates and replaces the Annexes to Regulation No. 1334/2000 
in order to take account of, inter alia, changes adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement ple-
nary session in December 2000.
42 The ITU in its most recent incarnation is principally based upon two founding treaties: 
the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (hereafter ITU Constitu-
tion), Geneva, done 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825 UNTS 1; UKTS 
1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539; ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Additional Plenipotentiary Con-
ference, Geneva, 1992 (1993), at 1; as amended in 1994 by the Instrument amending the 
Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (Geneva, 1992), Kyoto, done 
14 October 1994, entered into force 1 January 1996; Cm. 3447; ATS 1996 No. 10; Final Acts 
of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Kyoto, 1994 (1995), at 1, and in 1998 by the Instrument 
amending the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union of 22 Decem-
ber 1992, as amended 14 October 1994, Minneapolis, done, 6 November 1998, entered into 
force 1 January 2000; ATS 2000 No. 8; and the Convention of the International Telecommu-
nication Union, Geneva, done 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994; 1825 UNTS 
1; UKTS 1996 No. 24; Cm. 2539; ATS 1994 No. 28; Final Acts of the Additional Plenipoten-
tiary Conference, Geneva, 1992 (1993), at 71; as amended in 1994 by the Instrument amend-
ing the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (Geneva, 1992), Kyoto, 
done 14 October 1994, entered into force 1 January 1996; Cm. 3447; ATS 1996 No. 10; Final 
Acts of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Kyoto, 1994 (1995), at 23; and in 1998 by the Instru-
ment amending the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union of 22 De-
cember 1992, as amended 14 October 1994, Minneapolis, done, 6 November 1998, entered 
into force 1 January 2000; ATS 2000 No. 8.
43 Recital 8, EGSA Regulation.
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use” the frequencies concerned to the concessionaire.44 This ‘assignment’ cannot 
be equated with an ‘assignment’ necessary under ITU regulations vis-à-vis a pri-
vate operator, since that is a prerogative of an ITU member state.45 So it should be 
read as only referring to an internal, ‘intra-Galileo’ arrangement. It thus leaves un-
settled the question of who is going to arrange for future Galileo needs in terms of 
frequencies and orbits, or even to protect Galileo’s interests within the ITU context 
and framework in a general sense.
The EGSA Regulation indicates that EGSA should assist the Commission in all 
relevant matters, “particularly in cases where legislative and regulatory measures 
prove necessary.”46 One would imagine this would include ITU regulations per-
tinent for the coordination of Galileo frequencies and orbits. This, however, does 
not solve the issue either, since also the Commission is not empowered under cur-
rent ITU rules and practices to perform itself the necessary roles.
The operative (and binding) part of the EGSA Regulation does at least provide 
some help. EGSA shall “coordinate Member States’ actions in respect of the fre-
quencies necessary to ensure the operation of the system; it shall hold the right 
to use all these frequencies wherever the system is located”, and “it shall deal di-
rectly with the concession holder on matters relating to the use of these frequen-
cies”.47 The last phrase is obvious and meaningful, but the first two raise some fur-
ther issues.
EGSA can of course be given the competence under EC law to “coordinate Mem-
ber States’ actions” – but should it not have been given the competence to actually 
supervise and direct them? Does the coordination competence provide sufficient 
leverage to ensure that individual member states will not desist from activities on 
behalf of Galileo in the ITU framework when EGSA (or the Commission) would 
like them to do that – or on the contrary that they will take up the Galileo conces-
sionaire’s case if EGSA would like them to do so? We can only hope that this will 
remain a rather theoretical concern, ignoring practical and pragmatic approach-
es which would allow EGSA to play a key role in this regard. Yet, it has to be kept 
in mind that such coordination competencies in any case remain an internal mat-
ter: certainly for the time being non-Galileo states within the ITU framework can
----------------
44 Recital 9, EGSA Regulation.
45 ‘Assignment’ is defined in the ITU context as the “authorization given by an Adminis-
tration for a radio station to use a radio frequency or by an Administration for a radio sta-
tion to use a radio frequency or radio frequency channel under specified conditions”, Sec-
tion 1.18, Radio Regulations; whereas ‘Administration’ in turn is defined as “Any govern-
mental department or service responsible for discharging the obligations undertaken in 
the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, in the Convention of the 
International Telecommunication Union and in the Administrative Regulations”, Annex 
to the ITU Constitution, first bullet.
46 Recital 11, EGSA Regulation.
47 Art. 2(1)(d), EGSA Regulation.
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legally speaking ignore any EGSA role if this would suit their purposes.
This applies even more when it comes to holding “the right to use all these fre-
quencies wherever the system is located”: intra-Galileo, this makes sense, within 
the ITU framework however such a right can only be qualified as following from 
a proper assignment by an ITU member state following the process within ITU re-
garding allocation, coordination and allotment of frequencies.48 Thus, major ques-
tion marks for the concessionaire remain when it comes to the issue of who can 
and will under what circumstances take up Galileo’s case in the ITU context, and 
what the role for EGSA in this respect would actually turn out to be.
Comparing the current outcome of the establishment of EGSA as analysed in 
terms of legal personality with Recommendation # 6, it must be concluded there-
fore that the measure of international legal personality accorded to EGSA seems to 
fall way below the mark of a “clear and substantial” one as recommended. As a 
consequence, also the options for EGSA to comply with Recommendation # 13 – 
to exercise the necessary controls over intellectual property rights protection and 
enforcement, and to deal with relevant third-party claims – or Recommendation 
# 1 – generating sufficient political clout to defend Galileo’s commercial interests 
– seem likely to end up being fairly limited, in view of the absence of any clear in-
dications to the contrary.
6. The European GNSS Supervisory Authority and Liability
The GALILEI Study also came up with a set of Recommendations specifically re-
lating to liability. The most general and important one, Recommendation # 3, as 
indicated before calls for a “proper and generous liability regime” to be devised 
for Galileo, with a key role in this regard for EGSA. In addition, Recommenda-
tions # 8, 9, 10 and 11 dealt with more specific sub-issues: the options respective-
ly to implement a contractual liability chain as currently developed in the context 
of EUROCONTROL, to offer a second-tier funding system for liability claims, to 
deal appropriately with claims arising out of negligence, and to deal with the is-
sue of punitive damages as they could be awarded under the US jurisdiction. All 
such sub-issues tie in with the larger picture of establishing a proper and gener-
ous liability regime.
The EGSA Regulation however deals with the liability issue in summary fashion 
only, in spite of its crucial importance both from the point of view of the general 
public interests in safe Galileo operations and from the perspective of the private
----------------
48 ‘Allocation’ is defined in the ITU context as destining a frequency band “for the purpose 
of its use by one or more terrestrial or space radiocommunication services or the radio as-
tronomy service under specified conditions,” Section 1.16, Radio Regulations; whereas ‘al-
lotment’ is defined in that same context as the “entry of a designated frequency channel in 
an agreed plan, (...) for use by one or more Administrations for a terrestrial or space com-
munication service in one or more (...) countries or (...) areas,” Section 1.17, Radio Regula-
tions.
Towards MoniToring galileo         
113
operator interested in knowing its liabilities as precisely as possible in order to be 
able to take the relevant measures. With respect to contractual liability, the Regu-
lation simply provides that it “shall be governed by the law applicable to the con-
tract in question”.49 The European Court of Justice furthermore would be entitled 
to exercise jurisdiction if a relevant clause on arbitration contained in a contract 
concluded by EGSA provides for that.50 As for non-contractual liability, a rather 
general duty is provided for “in accordance with the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States”, to “make good any damage caused by its de-
partments or by its servants in the performance of their duties.”51 Whilst no doubt 
constituting a relevant clause of the EGSA Regulation, Article 17 does seem to pass 
by the real liability issues in the Galileo context by a wide margin.
Any comprehensive analysis of liability issues in the context of Galileo should 
start at the source – the satellite operations in outer space. As far as direct physical 
damage caused by space activities in general, including of course Galileo, is con-
cerned, this is ruled by Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty52 as further elaborated 
by the 1972 Liability Convention.53 This regime provides for liability for damage 
caused by a space object resting upon the “launching State(s)” of that space object; 
the concept of “launching State” being defined in a fourfold fashion.54 Such state 
liability would apply regardless of whether the actual operation causing the dam-
age – such as Galileo might come to represent – was privately conducted or even 
if the whole satellite venture would be a private one.
In particular the criterion of “procuring” a launch is subject to uncertainties from 
this perspective. Arguably the hosting of a ground station for Galileo, the activi-
ty of which causes a satellite to become involved in a major accident causing dam-
age, could be seen as making the host state a liable state under space law for such 
damage. At the international level, it has not been possible so far to arrive at any 
generally agreed interpretation or definition of the term “procurement”; in the ab-
sence thereof it becomes of interest to see how individual states in their national
----------------
49 Art. 17(1), EGSA Regulation.
50 See Art. 17(1), EGSA Regulation.
51 Art. 17(2), EGSA Regulation.
52 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Trea-
ty), London/Moscow/Washington, done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 
1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 
No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967).
53 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter 
Liability Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into 
force 1 September 1972; 961 UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 
5068; ATS 1975 No. 5; 10 ILM 965 (1971).
54 Art. I(c), Liability Convention, reads: “The term ‘launching State’ means: (i) a state which 
launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) a State from whose territory or fa-
cility a space object is launched.”
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efforts to establish relevant legislation have tried to deal with this issue.
Some national space laws explicitly or implicitly require a license also for ground 
station operations including arrangements on liability, reimbursement of state lia-
bility, and the need to provide insurance for that. For example, in the United States 
a license is required to “use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of ener-
gy or communications or signals by radio” from anywhere in the United States.55 
The attendant liability has to be dealt with in that context as well.56 Clearly, opera-
tions of a ground station using radio signals to control navigation satellites would 
fall under these requirements.
Similar conclusions might be drawn in respect of some of the other states with 
an operative national space law. In the case of Sweden, member state of both ESA 
and the European Union and hence of importance for any ‘European’ interpre-
tation and definition of “procurement”, a license is required for “all measures to 
manoeuvre or in any other way affect objects launched into outer space”, if con-
ducted from Swedish soil and/or by a Swedish national or national company, 
and licensees “shall reimburse the State what has been disbursed on account of 
the above-mentioned undertakings, unless special reasons tell against this”.57 The 
United Kingdom, the other ESA and EU member state, since a number of years 
having a full-fledged national framework law in place on activities in outer space, 
whilst limiting its licensing obligation ratione personae to UK nationals and na-
tional companies does also explicitly include in the scope of its licensing regime 
anything causing a space activity “to occur” or being “responsible for its continu-
ing.”58
For comparison’s sake furthermore, one could refer to the applicable Russian 
space law, which includes in its scope “the use of navigation (...) systems” and 
“other kinds of activities performed with the aid of space technologies” by anyone 
falling under Russian jurisdiction, and calls in principle for reimbursement of the 
Russian government of liability claims paid by the latter under international space 
law.59 A final example concerns South Africa, where “space activities” as leading 
to a license requirement under the relevant act are defined as “activities directly 
contributing to the launching of spacecraft and
----------------
55 Sec. 301, Communications Act, 19 June 1934; 47 U.S.C. 151 (1988); 48 Stat. 106.
56 See Sec. 206, Communications Act.
57 Secc. 1, 2, 6, Act on Space Activities, 1982: 963, 18 November 1982; National Space Leg-
islation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 398; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, E.II.1; 36 
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 11.
58 Sec. 13(2), cf. further Secc. 1, 2, 3, Outer Space Act, 18 July 1986, 1986 Chapter 38; Nation-
al Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 293; Space Law – Basic Legal Documents, 
E.I; 36 Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 12.
59 Art. 2(1), see further Artt. 1, 25, 30, Law of the Russian Federation on Space Activities, 
No. 5663-1, 20 August 1993, effective 6 October 1993; National Space Legislation of the 
World, Vol. I (2001), at 101.
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the operation of such craft in outer space”, and such activities all require a license 
if conducted from South African territory.60
Whatever the level of national detail in implementing the relevant internation-
al and national obligations pertaining to liability, it will be obvious that in any ar-
rangements allowing Galileo ground stations to operate on their respective terri-
tories the intended host states would want to shift the burden of any such liability 
onto the shoulders of Galileo, that is EGSA and/or the private concessionaire.
However, this is not even the whole story when it comes to liability for Galileo 
operations. The abovementioned international space law regime for liability and 
its national ramifications and implementations are, in view of the scope of that in-
ternational regime, only relevant for damages caused by a Galileo satellite physi-
cally harming another space object or causing terrestrial damage – arguably even 
restricted to such damage caused by physical impact, that is a crash.
In the case of Galileo, while the above is by no means a negligible issue, much 
more attention needs to be paid to the possible damage caused by the user of Gal-
ileo for example when that user, wrongfully trusting the signals and services pro-
vided to him, navigates incorrectly – into a wayside tree, a harbour facility, or a 
mountainside adjacent to an aircraft landing strip. This type of ‘indirect’ damage 
results in triggering other liability regimes applicable – for road accidents, mari-
time accidents or aviation accidents – normally making such user (and not Galileo 
itself) liable for the damage.61
But where it is Galileo’s intention to attract (commercial) transport users in par-
ticular to the SOL and make them pay for it, there is a clear interest for EGSA and 
the concessionaire to somehow allow derogation of such liability claims in case it 
can be proven the cause of the damage was a wrongful or absent Galileo signal. 
It thus might well be that the concession negotiations will result in the operator 
accepting a relevant reimbursement obligation up to a certain level, with EGSA
----------------
60 Sec. 1, see further Secc. 11, 14, Space Affairs Act, 6 September 1993, assented to on 23 June 
1993, No. 84 of 1993; Statutes of the Republic of South Africa – Trade and Industry, Issue 
No. 27, 21-44; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 413.
61 Cf. e.g. for aviation the international contractual liability system developed ever since 
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, Warsaw, done 12 October 1929, entered into force 13 February 1933; 137 LNTS 
11; USTS 876; UKTS 1933 No. 11; ATS 1963 No. 18; and culminating in the Convention for 
the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, Montreal, done 28 May 
1999, entered into force 4 November 2003; ICAO Doc. 9740; 48 ZLW 326 (1999); and the 
third-party liability conventions of 1933 and 1952: International Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to Damage Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Sur-
face, Rome, done 29 May 1933, entered into force 11 November 1942; 5 JAL 312 (1937), re-
spectively Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on 
the Surface, Rome, done 7 October 1952, entered into force 4 February 1958; 310 UNTS 181; 
ATS 1959 No. 1; ICAO Doc. 7364.
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and/or the individual member states of ESA and the European Union behind it 
accepting to reimburse (a certain part of) any amount of compensation over and 
above such first-tier private operatorliability.62 As of yet this is far from estab-
lished however. As mentioned above, the EGSA Regulation itself does not go fur-
ther than accepting non-contractual liability to the extent “in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States” and thus to “make 
good any damage caused by its departments or by its servants in the performance 
of their duties.”63 It would be difficult, to say the least, to read this as including 
the operations of the system by a private concessionaire – certainly not a “depart-
ment” or “servant” in the normal sense of the word.
To the extent that such a system for derogation of liability to Galileo would arise, 
agreements between EGSA or the Commission and host states would also have to 
deal with this aspect of liability, i.e. arranging for mutually acceptable procedures 
and rules once the question arises whether an activity conducted at the relevant 
ground station might have been partially or wholly responsible for a Galileo fail-
ure causing relevant damage.
7. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the EGSA Regulation takes a rather prudent approach towards es-
tablishing a public supervisor over Galileo and the private operations to be con-
ducted with it, when compared to the thirteen Recommendations stemming from 
the GALILEI Study cluster. To the extent that the Recommendations have been 
followed, this focused more on internal than external aspects: sufficient guaran-
tees would be in place for a first level of monitoring of Galileo and ensuring that 
its operations and activities are in line with general public interests from a Euro-
pean perspective, such as pertaining to safety and security. For example, the con-
tours of a certification system are provided for, and appropriate control over Gal-
ileo’s security aspects would indeed require not just an EGSA equipped with rele-
vant monitoring competencies, but the full political weight of the European Union, 
Commission and ultimately the sovereign member states to be behind it.
With regard to some of the crucial external features, however, the picture is con-
siderably less satisfactory. Whilst it may, from a political perspective, perhaps be 
understandable that the European authorities, including the Commission, do not 
want to give EGSA too much rope to conduct its own external policies, there are 
several dangers inherent in that approach which have been noted above. The lia-
bility issue in particular is dealt with in very succinct fashion; it can only be hoped 
that the concession will lay down the basis for a scheme to deal with ‘indirect’
----------------
62 Cf. the strong recommendations made in this respect by Recommendations and Conclu-
sions, in particular 18-9, 21-2, 159-60, 220-1, 232-8.
63 Art. 17(2), EGSA Regulation.
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third-party liability issues and that such a scheme will then be further elaborated 
at the international legislative level. Also for general safety purposes, the measure 
of international legal competencies allocated to EGSA, which could lead to a con-
siderably larger measure of (acceptance of) international legal personality, is rath-
er meagre. In contrast with security issues, where such care is not only acceptable 
but effectively wise, on safety issues Galileo stands to benefit much more from the 
efficiency, transparency, and direct accountability which – for example – a Galileo 
convention could offer to any independent observer, state or private company.
In the final analysis, an evaluation of EGSA and its expected status and role is per-
haps a matter of whether the glass is half-empty or half-full. With a view to the 
many revolutionary features and benefits which Galileo, once fully operational, is 
expected to bring to Europe in particular, and to the rapid technological, opera-
tional, commercial, economic, social, and political developments which take place 
all at the same time, it is perhaps fairer to take the latter approach – the glass is al-
ready half-full. Yet, this should not lead to negating the essential need to further 
deal with some of the problems detected in the currently envisaged structure, and 
to foregoing the opportunities which are there to still do something about them. 
After all, why not try to fill the glass to capacity?
